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Nelson: Reading Between the Blurred Lines of Fisher v. University of Texa

Diversity in Legal Education and
the Legal Profession: A Symposium
Honoring Indiana Chief Justice
Randall Shepard
READING BETWEEN THE BLURRED LINES OF
FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
Eboni S. Nelson*
I. INTRODUCTION
After more than eight months of anticipation and speculation,1 the
Supreme Court finally issued its opinion in Fisher v. University of Texas at
Austin.2 Contrary to fears held by some and hopes held by others,3 the
*
Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law
School; B.A., Wake Forest University. It is truly an honor to be included in a symposium
issue honoring Indiana Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard, who has done so much to
contribute to the diversity of the legal profession. I would like to thank Associate Dean
Jeremy Telman, Matt Brandabur, and the members of the Valparaiso University Law
Review for the invitation to participate. I would also like to thank Derek Black and
Danielle Holley-Walker for comments, suggestions, and discussions on this Essay. My
thanks also to Chelsea Rikard for her invaluable research assistance, and Scott and Ella
Nelson for their love and support. This Essay is dedicated to my grandmother, Geraldine
Cohen, who always shared and rejoiced in my educational, professional, and personal
achievements. May you find eternal rest in the loving arms of the Lord.
1
See, e.g., Bret D. Asbury, The Fisher Oral Argument: Why Affirmative Action Might
Endure, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 107, 118–19 (2013) (speculating as to how the Court would
decide Fisher); Ediberto Roman, I Am No Jimmy the Greek—Round Two . . . Fisher v. Texas,
HUFFPOST MIAMI (April 9, 2013, 5:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/edibertoroman/fisher-v-university-of-texas-at-austin_b_3037969.html (attempting to predict the
result in Fisher); Abigail Thernstrom, Will the Court Strike Down Affirmative Action?, CNN
OPINION (Feb. 22, 2012, 4:32 PM), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-02-22/opinion/opinion
_thernstrom-race-court_1_racial-double-standards-affirmative-action-minority-students?_s
=PM:OPINION (discussing the possibilities for the Fisher decision). Oral arguments in
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin took place on October 10, 2012. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 1, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345). The
case was decided on June 24, 2013. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2411.
2
133 S. Ct. 2411.
3
See Allen Rostron, Affirmative Action, Justice Kennedy, and the Virtues of the Middle
Ground, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1037, 1040 (2013) (asserting that Justice Kagan’s recusal from
Fisher heightened “[f]ears that Fisher [would] bring the end of affirmative action”); Gerald
Torres, Fisher v. University of Texas: Living in the Dwindling Shadow of LBJ’s America, 65
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 97, 101–02 (2012), available at http://www.vanderbiltlaw
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Court did not use the case as an opportunity to overrule Grutter v.
Bollinger,4 thereby prohibiting the consideration of race in higher
education admissions decisions.5 Instead, the Court vacated the Fifth
Circuit’s decision upholding the University of Texas’s (“UT’s” or
“University’s”) race-based admissions policy and remanded the case “for
further proceedings consistent with [the] opinion.”6
At first glance, the majority opinion authored by Justice Anthony
Kennedy appears to be a straight-forward tutorial regarding the
parameters of strict scrutiny by which courts are to examine the
constitutionality of race-based admissions plans.7 After concluding that

review.org/2012/07/fisher-v-university-of-texas-living-in-the-dwindling-shadow-of-lbj%
E2%80%99s-america/ (discussing affirmative action proponents’ fear that the Fisher Court
would dismantle the diversity rationale as sanctioned in Grutter v. Bollinger and Regents of
University of California v. Bakke); Adam Liptak, Justices Step Up Scrutiny of Race in College
Entry, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/06/25/us/affirmative-action-decision.html?hp&pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing
the relief felt by civil rights groups following the Court’s decision in Fisher); Jon
Fleischman, Ward Connerly: The Disappointment of Fisher v. University of Texas,
FLASHREPORT (July 8, 2013, 5:49 AM), http://www.flashreport.org/blog/2013/07/
08/ward-connerly-the-disappointment-of-fisher-vs-university-of-texas/ (characterizing the
Fisher decision as “a major disappointment” for “anti-preference advocates”); Adam
Freedman, Fisher: The Court Dodges the Big Issue, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 24, 2013, 12:47
PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/351869/fisher-court-dodges-big-issueadam-freedman (“The majority dodged the opportunity to overturn Grutter and the regime
of state-sponsored discrimination that it spawned.”); Richard Sander, Commentary on
Fisher: A Classic Kennedy Compromise, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2013, 4:18 PM), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2013/06/commentay-on-fisher-a-classic-kennedy-compromise/
(noting
that the Fisher decision was “not the sweeping repudiation of racial preferences that many
conservatives hoped for, and that the higher education establishment greatly feared”).
4
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
5
See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2417 (“We take those cases [including Grutter] as given for
purposes of deciding this case.”). The Court further noted that the Fisher petitioner did not
ask the Court to reconsider Grutter’s sanctioning of student body diversity as a
constitutional compelling interest. Id. at 2419. The Court stated, “the parties do not
challenge, and the Court therefore does not consider, the correctness of [Grutter’s narrowly
tailored] determination.” Id. at 2421. While adhering to his steadfast view that race-based
affirmative action amounts to constitutionally proscribed discrimination, Justice Scalia
acknowledged that “[t]he petitioner in this case did not ask us to overrule Grutter’s holding
that a ‘compelling interest’ in the educational benefits of diversity can justify racial
preferences in university admissions.” Id. at 2422 (Scalia, J., concurring).
6
Id. (majority opinion).
7
See id. at 2417–21 (discussing the type of review the Court has exercised to race-based
admission plans in prior cases); see also Elise Boddie, Commentary on Fisher: In with a Bang,
Out with a Fizzle, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2013, 11:05 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2013/06/fisher-v-university-of-texas-in-with-a-bang-out-with-a-fizzle/ (“[Fisher] charts no
new doctrinal territory but instead reads more like a hornbook on strict scrutiny.”); Melissa
Hart, Fisher Commentary: Everyone Wins, Everyone Loses, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2013, 9:15
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/fisher-commentary-everyone-wins-everyone-
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the Fifth Circuit failed to analyze the UT plan under the proper
constitutional standard, due to the deference shown to the University
during its narrow tailoring analysis,8 the Court decided that “fairness to
the litigants and the courts that heard the case require[d] that it be
remanded so that the admissions process [could] be considered and
judged under a correct analysis.”9 While the University and other
affirmative action supporters may view the Court’s decision as an
optimistic signpost for the future of race-based admissions policies,10 this
Essay fears that, unfortunately, such optimism may be misplaced. It
argues that a closer reading of the opinion reveals troubling language
and sentiments that could detrimentally impact both the UT admissions
plan, specifically, and the future of racial diversity in higher education,
more broadly.
II. JUSTICE KENNEDY’S FALSE HOPE
Perhaps one of the most troubling, although not surprising, aspects
of Fisher is that Justice Kennedy authored the seven-to-one majority
opinion.11 Given the composition of the Court hearing the case,12 many
affirmative action proponents rested their hopes on Justice Kennedy and
the possibility that his vote would result in a four-to-four tie, thereby
reaffirming the Fifth Circuit’s decision upholding UT’s admissions

loses/ (“[The opinion] simply rearticulates the strict scrutiny standard as applied to
education policy . . . .”).
8
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2415, 2420–21.
9
Id. at 2421.
10
See Liptak, supra note 3 (“The compromise that the majority reached was at least a
reprieve for affirmative action in higher education, and civil rights groups that had feared
for the future of race-conscious admission programs were relieved.”); John Schwartz &
Richard Pérez-Peña, Lacking Definitive Ruling, Both Sides Claim Victory, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
2013, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/us/lacking-definitiveruling-on-affirmative-action-both-sides-claim-victory.html (“Civil rights groups that favor
race-conscious admissions cheered the ruling, arguing that the court had upheld its 2003
decision in Grutter v Bollinger.”); Katey Psencik, Both Sides Claim Victory in Fisher v. UT,
USA TODAY (June 25, 2013, 7:07 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2013/06/25/fisher-ut-supreme-court/2457939/ (“Defenders of affirmative action say that
since the court did not reverse current policies, the odds are in their favor.”).
11
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2415. Having recused herself because of her previous involvement
in the case while serving as Solicitor General, Justice Elena Kagan did not participate in the
consideration or decision of Fisher. Id. at 2422; Liptak, supra note 3.
12
See Cara Davis, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: How Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law Is the
Unconstitutional Use of Race and a Racial Quota in Disguise, 40 S.U. L. REV. 367, 388–90 (2013)
(discussing the changes in the Court’s composition and the effect those changes might have
on the Fisher decision); supra note 11 and accompanying text (explaining that Justice Kagan
recused herself).
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policy.13 Instead, as others have suggested, Justice Kennedy appears to
have wielded his influence to strike a compromise between the four
conservative justices who almost certainly would have invalidated the
plan and two of the liberal justices who likely would have found the plan
constitutional.14 In so doing, Justice Kennedy impliedly suggested that
the University and its supporters should “[k]eep hope alive”15 regarding
the future of the plan’s constitutionality and, by implication, the future
However, Justice
of race-based admissions policies in general.16
Kennedy’s jurisprudence in cases involving racial classifications in the
educational context suggests otherwise.17 If and when the current Court
considers the constitutionality of future race-based admissions policies,
13
See Rostron, supra note 3, at 1041 (explaining that the University hoped Justice
Kennedy would vote to uphold the affirmative action program, thereby creating a tie and
affirming the Fifth Circuit’s ruling); Derek Black, Fisher v. Texas, Part II: Making Sausage,
EDUC. L. PROF BLOG (June 24, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/education_law/
2013/06/fisher-v-texas-part-ii-making-sausage.html (opining that the four-to-four tie
would have been the author’s best case scenario); Khiara M. Bridges, The Problem with
Affirmative Action After Grutter: Some Reflections on Fisher v. University of Texas,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Mar. 6, 2012, 11:30 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/
archives/2012/03/the-problem-with-affirmative-action-after-grutter-some-reflections-onfisher-v-university-of-texas.html (asserting that affirmative action supporters must hope
for a four-to-four split).
14
Black, supra note 13; Sander, supra note 3.
15
“Keep hope alive” is a popular quote often attributed to Reverend Jesse L. Jackson, Sr.
See Daniel Solórzano et al., Keeping Race in Place: Racial Microaggressions and Campus Racial
Climate at the University of California, Berkeley, 23 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 15, 69 (2002)
(describing “[k]eep hope alive” as Jesse Jackson’s “mantra”).
16
Noah Feldman, Op-Ed., Kennedy Remains the Court’s Fulcrum, STAR-LEDGER, June 25,
2013, at 13, available at 2013 WLNR 15494254; Miranda Leitsinger, Supreme Court Ruling
Encourages Supporters—and Opponents—of Affirmative Action, NBC NEWS (June 24, 2013, 4:02
PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/24/19119553-supreme-court-rulingencourages-supporters-and-opponents-of-affirmative-action?lite.
17
See Vikram David Amar, Is Honesty the Best (Judicial) Policy in Affirmative Action Cases?
Fisher v. University of Texas Gives the Court (Yet) Another Chance to Say Yes, 65 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANC 77, 85–88 (2012), available at http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/
2012/07/is-honesty-the-best-judicial-policy-in-affirmative-action-cases-fisher-v-universityof-texas-gives-the-court-yet-another-chance-to-say-yes/ (discussing some of Justice
Kennedy’s prior affirmative action decisions); Rostron, supra note 3, at 1041 (explaining that
Justice Kennedy “did not like the Michigan Law School’s policy in Grutter”); Girardeau A.
Spann, Fisher v. Grutter, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 45, 48 (2012), available at
http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/2012/07/fisher-v-grutter/ (“Justice Kennedy has
always voted with the conservative bloc to invalidate racial affirmative action.”); Andrew
LeGrand, Note, Narrowing the Tailoring: How Parents Involved Limits the Use of Race in
Higher Education Admissions, 21 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 53, 80 (2009) (asserting that Justice
Kennedy’s track record indicates that “the future for explicitly race-conscious admissions
programs does not look good”); The Affirmative Action War Goes On, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22,
2012, at SR12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/opinion/sunday/theaffirmative-action-war-goes-on.html (“Justice Anthony Kennedy, while no fan of
affirmative action, has in past decisions supported some use of race in certain situations.”).
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including that challenged in Fisher, it is doubtful that Justice Kennedy
will be affirmative action’s saving grace as many have hoped.
A. “Yes” as to Ends
Similar to his former colleague, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who
was commonly viewed as casting the “decisive swing vote” in several
important cases,18 scholars and commentators have described Justice
Kennedy as presently filling this role.19 Based, in part, on his
concurrence in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1,20 a case that also concerned race and education issues, and
his dissent in Grutter, many people expected Justice Kennedy to play an
integral role in the outcome of Fisher.21
William Branigin et al., Supreme Court Justice O’Connor Resigns, WASH. POST (July 1,
2005, 7:11 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/01/
AR2005070100653.html; see Mark Klock, Cooperation and Division: An Empirical Analysis of
Voting Similarities and Differences During the Stable Rehnquist Court Era—1994 to 2005, 22
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 537, 540 & n.14 (2013) (identifying Justices O’Connor and
Kennedy “as the swing votes in close decisions”); Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median
Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1305 (2005) (“Virtually all
contemporary commentary stresses the critical role Justice O’Connor (and, to a lesser
extent, Kennedy) plays on the current Court by casting key votes in many consequential
cases.”).
19
See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard, and the Evisceration of
Women’s Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 292 (2010), available at
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl/vol16/iss2/3 (identifying Justice Kennedy as
“the Court’s swing vote on abortion issues”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 802 (2009) (noting that
Justice Kennedy “swings between” the Court’s conservative and liberal blocs); Rostron,
supra note 3, at 1037 (“With the rest of the Court split between a bloc of four reliably liberal
jurists and a cadre of four conservatives, the spotlight regularly falls on Justice Kennedy,
the swing voter that each side in every closely divided and ideologically charged case
desperately hopes to attract.”); Jeffrey Toobin, The Court’s Gay-Marriage Confusion, NEW
YORKER (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/03/
supreme-court-prop-8-toobin-kennedy.html (opining that the Supreme Court’s decision
regarding the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8 banning same-sex marriage
would likely depend on Justice Kennedy).
20
551 U.S. 701, 782–98 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
21
See, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, Grutter’s Denouement: Three Templates from the Roberts Court,
107 NW. U. L. REV. 1045, 1055 (2013) (“As is true with many cases, the outcome in Fisher
appears to lie with Justice Kennedy’s vote.”); R. Randall Kelso, Justice Kennedy’s
Jurisprudence on the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 103, 138 (2013)
(“With the replacement of Justice O’Connor by Justice Alito in 2006, Justice Kennedy will
likely become the critical swing vote on race-based affirmative action cases, including
[Fisher].”); Rostron, supra note 3, at 1041–42 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s potential votes
and rationales in Fisher); Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: Is Affirmative Action About to
End?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 9, 2012, 12:02 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/
argument-preview-is-affirmative-action-about-to-end/ (discussing Justice Kennedy’s
18
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In Parents Involved, the Court examined the constitutionality of racebased student assignment plans employed by school districts located in
Seattle, Washington and Louisville, Kentucky.22 Although neither school
district was presently bound by a court ordered desegregation decree,23
school officials in both districts sought to achieve the benefits of diverse
elementary and secondary schools by voluntarily employing racial
guidelines and tiebreakers when making student assignment decisions.24
In its plurality opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court
found both plans to be unconstitutional because they were not narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.25 The plurality
characterized the school districts’ goals as unconstitutional racial
balancing and refused to acknowledge any other compelling interest
asserted by the school districts.26
Although joining in other parts of the Court’s opinion and
concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy wrote separately to
sanction two constitutionally permissible goals in the context of
potential vote in Fisher); Daniel Fisher, Odds Are Kennedy Will Decide Affirmative Action Case.
But What Will He Decide?, FORBES (May 29, 2013, 2:43 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/danielfisher/2013/05/29/odds-are-kennedy-will-decide-affirmative-action-case-butwhat-will-he-decide/ (predicting that Justice Kennedy will decide and pen the opinion in
Fisher).
22
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711, 715.
23
The Court noted that, “Seattle has never operated segregated schools—legally
separate schools for students of different races—nor has it ever been subject to courtordered desegregation.” Id. at 712. Further, “Jefferson County operated under [a
desegregation] decree until 2000, when the District Court dissolved the decree after finding
that the district had achieved unitary status by eliminating ‘[t]o the greatest extent
practicable’ the vestiges of its prior policy of segregation.” Id. at 715–16 (quoting Hampton
v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 360 (W.D. Ky. 2000)). However, Justice
Breyer noted in his dissent that “[n]o one here disputes that Louisville’s segregation was de
jure. But what about Seattle’s? Was it de facto? De jure? A mixture? Opinions
differed. . . . The plurality does not seem confident as to the answer.” Id. at 820 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Justice Breyer also discussed the legal challenges the NAACP filed against the
Seattle School District alleging unlawful racial segregation of its public schools and
Seattle’s responses to the challenges. Id. at 808–11; see Michelle Adams, Racial Inclusion,
Exclusion and Segregation in Constitutional Law, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 31–32 (2012)
(discussing the “elusive” distinction between de jure and de facto segregation as evidenced
in Parents Involved).
24
See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711–12, 716–17 (describing the racial guidelines the
Seattle and Jefferson County school districts employed). “Each school district argue[d] that
educational and broader socialization benefits flow[ed] from a racially diverse learning
environment . . . .” Id. at 725.
25
See id. at 726 (“[I]t is clear that the racial classifications employed by the districts are
not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the educational and social benefits asserted
to flow from racial diversity.”).
26
Id. at 725–33. “The principle that racial balancing is not permitted is one of substance,
not semantics. Racial balancing is not transformed from ‘patently unconstitutional’ to a
compelling state interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial diversity.’” Id. at 732.
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elementary and secondary education—the avoidance of racial isolation
and the achievement of a diverse student body.27 In his concurrence,
Justice
Kennedy
evidenced
his
commitment
to
“school
districts . . . continuing the important work of bringing together students
of different racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds.”28 As the Court
turned its attention to Fisher, supporters of race-based affirmative action
were—and continue to be—hopeful that Justice Kennedy would be
equally committed to this pursuit in the context of higher education.29
Because the Fisher decision did not specifically address the merits of
the UT plan,30 it is impossible to know with certainty whether Justice
Kennedy would sanction the University’s interest in attaining the
educational benefits that stem from a racially diverse learning
environment.31 However, considering that the educational goals the
University seeks to accomplish “mirror those approved by the Supreme
Court in Grutter,”32 one can look to Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion
in Grutter to gain some insight as to how he would likely view the
matter.33

27
Id. at 797–98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
Kennedy reasoned that, “[d]iversity, depending on its meaning and definition, is a
compelling educational goal a school district may pursue.” Id. at 783. He further stated,
“[t]o the extent the plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that state and
local school authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my
view, profoundly mistaken.” Id. at 788.
28
Id. at 798.
29
See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text (explaining why affirmative action
supporters rely on Justice Kennedy to protect affirmative action programs); see also David
Gans, Fisher v. University of Texas, Justice Kennedy, and the Text and History of the Fourteenth
Amendment, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 28, 2012), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/02/fisher-vuniversity-of-texas-justice.html (“Fisher gives Justice Kennedy the opportunity to make
good on his words [in Parents Involved] and to honor the promise of equality at the core of
the Constitution’s text and history.”); Marc H. Morial, To Be Equal # 40: Supreme Court to
Hear Major Affirmative Action Case, NAT’L URB. LEAGUE (Oct. 3, 2012), http://nul.iam
empowered.com/content/tbe40-supreme-court-hear-major-affirmative-action-case (“The
balance of the Court has shifted right since Grutter. But we are hopeful that the High Court
will reaffirm the nation’s highest values by continuing its support of diversity in our
colleges and universities.”).
30
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013) (“The Court vacates
th[e] judgment, but fairness to the litigants and the courts that heard the case requires that
it be remanded so that the admissions process can be considered and judged under the
correct analysis.” (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Penã, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995))).
31
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 225–26, 230 (5th Cir. 2011)
(discussing the University’s proposed benefits of a racially diverse learning environment),
vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Brief for Respondents at 6–7, 21, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No.
11-345) (arguing the educational benefits of a diverse student body).
32
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 230.
33
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387–95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Justice Kennedy began his dissent in Grutter by stating the principle
of permissible race-based affirmative action, as set forth in Justice
Powell’s opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.34 He
approvingly asserted that Justice Powell’s opinion “states the correct rule
for resolving this case.”35 While it may be possible that this statement
was merely in reference to the correct application of strict scrutiny,
which Justice Kennedy found lacking in Grutter’s majority opinion,36
rather than his approval of the diversity goals sought in Bakke, additional
language in his dissent suggests that Justice Kennedy does in fact
approve of the appropriate consideration of race in higher education
admissions decisions.37
According to Justice Kennedy, “[t]here is no constitutional objection
to the goal of considering race as one modest factor among many others
to achieve diversity.”38 In fact, in Fisher, he acknowledged the values
and benefits that are served by assembling a diverse student body.39
Although Justice Kennedy’s acknowledgements could foreshadow a
bright future for affirmative action, his statements regarding the means
by which school officials can pursue such benefits cast a bleak shadow
over the long-term viability of race-based admissions policies.
B. “No” as to Means
Although Justice Kennedy’s opinions in Parents Involved and Grutter
suggest that he supports the goal of creating racially diverse student
bodies, they also evidence his unwillingness to sanction racial
classifications and preferences as the means by which to achieve this
goal.40 For instance, in his concurrence in Parents Involved, he found the
Id. at 387 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289–91, 315–18 (1978)).
Id.
36
See id. (“The Court, however, does not apply strict scrutiny.”). Justice Kennedy
described the majority’s application of strict scrutiny as “nothing short of perfunctory.” Id.
at 388–89. He also accused the majority of suspending and abandoning strict scrutiny in its
analysis of the challenged plan. Id. at 393–95.
37
See, e.g., id. at 392 (“To be constitutional, a university’s compelling interest in a diverse
student body must be achieved by a system where individual assessment is safeguarded
through the entire process.”). Justice Kennedy also stated that “the Court’s important
holding allow[ed] racial minorities to have their special circumstances considered in order
to improve their educational opportunities.” Id. at 395. He further “reiterate[d] [his]
approval of giving appropriate consideration to race in this one context . . . .” Id.
38
Id. at 392–93.
39
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013).
40
See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV. 937, 943 (2008)
(“Justice Kennedy’s Parents Involved concurrence demonstrates both an openness to racial
diversity as an ideal and an abhorrence of ‘[g]overnmental classifications that command
people to march in different directions based on racial typologies.’” (quoting Parents
34
35
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racial classifications employed by the school districts to be
unconstitutional.41 Justice Kennedy began his opinion by expressing his
concern that “[t]o make race matter now so that it might not matter later
may entrench the very prejudices we seek to overcome.”42 In light of this
concern, he subjected the plans to a rigorous, detailed review and
rejected the school districts’ contention that they had crafted narrowly
tailored means to achieve their interests.43
Despite Justice Kennedy’s vote to invalidate the plans, many
scholars and civil rights advocates have lauded Justice Kennedy for his
endorsement of race-consciousness as it relates to school officials’ efforts
to eradicate racial isolation in their schools.44 While it is true that Justice
Kennedy asserted that school administrators are free to develop raceInvolved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))).
41
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782.
42
Id.
Justice Kennedy expressed similar concerns in Grutter when he stated,
“[p]referment by race, when resorted to by the State, can be the most divisive of all policies,
containing within it the potential to destroy confidence in the Constitution and in the idea
of equality.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
43
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 783–84, 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). With regard to the Louisville plan, Justice Kennedy wrote:
The government bears the burden of justifying its use of individual
racial classifications. As part of that burden it must establish, in detail,
how decisions based on an individual student’s race are made in a
challenged governmental program. The Jefferson County Board of
Education fails to meet this threshold mandate.
Id. at 784. “Far from being narrowly tailored to its purposes, this system threatens to defeat
its own ends, and the [Seattle] school district has provided no convincing explanation for
its design.” Id. at 787.
44
See, e.g., Adams, supra note 40, at 943 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s openness to racial
diversity); Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Glass Half Full: Envisioning the Future of Race Preference
Policies, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 385, 416–27 (2008) (analyzing the value of Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence on then existing and future race-based policies); Cedric Merlin
Powell, Schools, Rhetorical Neutrality, and the Failure of the Colorblind Equal Protection Clause,
10 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 362, 369–70 (2008) (stating that scholars have contended that
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence provides hope that race-conscious plans will remain
constitutional); Steven T. Collis, Note, A Narrow Path to Diversity: The Constitutionality of
Rezoning Plans and Strategic Site Selection of Schools After Parents Involved, 107 MICH. L. REV.
501, 522–23 (2008) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion and characterizing it
as a hopeful message); Supreme Court Rejects Public School Diversity Plans that Take Race into
Account, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., June 29, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 12312875 (reporting
the Court’s decision and explaining that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is crucial for school
districts seeking guidance); see also Statement from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund on the
Supreme Court’s Rulings in Seattle and Louisville School Cases, SUP. CT.—SCH. INTEGRATION
(June 28, 2007), http://scintegration.blogspot.com/2007/06/statement-from-naacp-legaldefense-fund.html (supporting the majority’s recognition that educational diversity is a
compelling interest, which was evinced by Justice Kennedy’s refusal to join the majority’s
conclusion that schools do not possess an interest in providing diversity in educational
settings).
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conscious measures to help assemble a diverse student body,45 he
instructed them to do so “without treating each student in different
fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race.”46
In fact, after suggesting several facially race-neutral means by which
school authorities can pursue diversity,47 Justice Kennedy warned that
“individual racial classifications employed in this manner may be
considered legitimate only if they are a last resort to achieve a compelling
interest.”48
As evidenced by his opinions in Grutter and Fisher, whether the
consideration of an applicant’s race is in fact a last resort, such that it is
necessary to achieve diversity, appears to be of vital concern to Justice
Kennedy. In his Grutter dissent, Justice Kennedy took the majority to
task for its alleged “perfunctory” review of the University of Michigan
Law School’s (“Law School”) admissions program.49 According to
Justice Kennedy, the majority erred in affording deference to the Law
School when examining whether its race-based plan was narrowly
tailored to achieve its goals.50 He contended that the majority’s lax
review would discourage universities from earnestly exploring raceneutral measures to achieve their diversity goals.51 Furthermore,
because, according to Justice Kennedy, “[o]ther programs do exist which
will be more effective in bringing about the harmony and mutual respect
among all citizens that our constitutional tradition has always sought,”52
45
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787–89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
46
Id. at 789.
47
See id. (suggesting options such as “drawing attendance zones with general
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special
programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments,
performance, and other statistics by race”). Interestingly, Justice Kennedy’s list of raceneutral measures did not include consideration of students’ socioeconomic status. Id.
While it is impossible to know with certainty why he chose not to include this often
discussed and suggested means of integration in his list of constitutionally permissible
measures, his omission may be due, in part, to the fact that such class-based plans often
require individual classifications similar to those utilized in race-based plans, which Justice
Kennedy does not seem to support. For further discussion of this theory and of the future
of socioeconomic integration post-Parents Involved, see Eboni S. Nelson, The Availability and
Viability of Socioeconomic Integration Post-Parents Involved, 59 S.C. L. REV. 841 (2008).
48
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (emphasis added). It is worth noting that Justice Kennedy suggested that the
school districts may have been able to achieve their diversity goals through the use of “a
more nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and student characteristics that might
include race as a component;” however, he did not discuss this option in detail. Id.
49
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 388–89 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
50
Id.
51
Id. at 394–95.
52
Id.
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the Court should “demand” the utilization of such programs, rather than
sanctioning and, thereby, encouraging the continued use of affirmative
action plans such as that upheld in the case.53
In Fisher, UT modeled its race-based admissions policy after the
Michigan plan approved in Grutter.54 However, UT also employs an
arguably effective, race-neutral admissions program,55 the sort of which
Justice Kennedy seems to prefer. The Texas Top Ten Percent Plan
(“Percent Plan”)—granting Texas high school students who graduate in
the top ten percent of their class automatic admission into the state’s
public colleges and universities56—has contributed to the diversity of the
UT student body.57 However, university officials argue that the Percent
Plan has failed to enroll a “critical mass” of racially diverse students such
that the educational benefits of diversity can be realized.58 Considering
that Justice Kennedy was not receptive to the Law School’s arguments
regarding critical mass in Grutter,59 the fact that the Percent Plan

Id. at 395.
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2013) (comparing the raceconscious policies used in Michigan to the University of Texas’s policy). In her dissent,
Justice Ginsberg also noted that “the University has taken care to follow the model
approved by the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger.” Id. at 2433 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting); see
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 217–18 (5th Cir. 2011) (“We begin with
Grutter v. Bollinger because UT’s race-conscious admissions procedures were modeled after
the program it approved.”), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
55
See Eboni S. Nelson, In Defense of Deference: The Case for Respecting Educational
Autonomy and Expert Judgments in Fisher v. Texas, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1133, 1138 & n.23
(2013) (discussing disagreements between the parties in Fisher concerning the effectiveness
and race-neutrality of UT’s Top Ten Percent Plan); see also Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2433
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“I have said before and reiterate here that only an ostrich could
regard the supposedly neutral alternatives as race unconscious.” (citing Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244, 303 n.10 (2003))).
56
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2416.
57
Id. As detailed in the majority opinion:
Before the admissions program at issue in this case, in the last year
under the post-Hopwood AI/PAI system that did not consider race, the
entering class was 4.5% African-American and 16.9% Hispanic. This is
in contrast with the 1996 pre-Hopwood and Top Ten Percent regime,
when race was explicitly considered, and the University’s entering
freshman class was 4.1% African-American and 14.5% Hispanic.
Id.; see Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224 (noting that the Percent Plan has increased diversity in the
student body at UT).
58
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2416; see Fisher, 631 F.3d at 244–45 (addressing UT’s assertion that
its plan was necessary because diversity in the classroom had decreased).
59
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 389 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice
Kennedy stated:
The dissenting opinion by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, which I join in full,
demonstrates beyond question why the concept of critical mass is a
delusion used by the Law School to mask its attempt to make race an
53
54
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produces some diversity may lead Justice Kennedy and other justices to
conclude that UT’s consideration of race is not necessary to achieve its
academic goals.
According to Fisher, necessity is an important component when
examining the constitutionality of affirmative action plans.60 Justice
Kennedy stated that narrow tailoring “involves a careful judicial inquiry
into whether a university could achieve sufficient diversity without
using racial classifications.”61 In light of the Court’s reasoning, a racebased plan is likely to be struck down if a court finds that practicable
race-neutral measures, such as the Percent Plan, will enable universities
to sufficiently achieve the benefits of diversity.62
Again, because the Court did not examine the constitutionality of the
UT plan, it is impossible to know whether Justice Kennedy would have
found the admissions policy to be narrowly tailored. However, his
opinion in Fisher is laced with language suggesting his disinclination for
approving the University’s use of race-based means.63 After discussing
the three cases—Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,64 Gratz v.
Bollinger,65 and Grutter v. Bollinger66—that address the issue of racial
considerations in higher education admissions,67 Justice Kennedy made a
point to quote language included in other cases that emphasize the
perceived harms associated with all racial classifications. He wrote:
“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their
ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free
people,” and therefore “are contrary to our traditions
and hence constitutionally suspect.” “‘[B]ecause racial
characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis for
disparate treatment,’” “the Equal Protection Clause

automatic factor in most instances and to achieve numerical goals
indistinguishable from quotas.
Id.
See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (“Narrow tailoring . . . requires that the reviewing court
verify that it is ‘necessary’ for a university to use race to achieve the educational benefits of
diversity.” (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978))).
61
Id.
62
See id. (explaining that strict scrutiny places a burden on the University to
demonstrate that race-neutral alternatives are insufficient).
63
See infra text accompanying note 68 (providing part of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in
Fisher).
64
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
65
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
66
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
67
See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2417–18 (explaining the three prior decisions concerning
classification of individuals by race in the education system).
60
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demands that racial classifications . . . be subjected to the
‘most rigid scrutiny.’”68
This language, coupled with the fact that Justice Kennedy “has always
voted . . . to invalidate racial affirmative action,”69 suggests that,
notwithstanding his general support for diversity as a compelling
interest, he is unlikely to support the University’s plan in Fisher. This
possibility could have a detrimental impact not only on the University,
but also on all institutions of higher education that seek to assemble a
diverse student body through the use of race-based means.
III. THE TENUOUS FUTURE OF RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
In reading the Court’s opinion in Fisher, it appears that the end may
be near for affirmative action as we know it. Although the Court did not
revisit or overrule Grutter, because the petitioners did not request that it
do so,70 some of the justices obviously would have welcomed the
opportunity.71 While Justice Kennedy does not directly advocate for
overruling Grutter, parts of his opinion imply as much. Justice Kennedy
noted the disagreement that exists between current justices regarding
“whether Grutter was consistent with the principles of equal
protection.”72 He insinuated that the Court incorrectly held that the Law
School’s plan was narrowly tailored.73 He concluded his opinion by
juxtaposing Justice O’Connor’s statement in Grutter that “[s]trict scrutiny
is not ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact,’”74 with his own admonition that
68
Id. at 2418–19 (citations omitted) (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000);
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)).
69
Spann, supra note 17, at 48.
70
See supra note 5 and accompanying text (explaining that the petitioners in Fisher did
not ask the court to overrule Grutter).
71
For example, Justice Scalia stated: “I adhere to the view I expressed in Grutter v.
Bollinger: ‘The Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race, and
state-provided education is no exception.’” Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
Justice Thomas further stated: “I write separately to explain that I would overrule Grutter
v. Bollinger, and hold that a State’s use of race in higher education admissions decisions is
categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. (Thomas, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
72
Id. at 2419 (majority opinion).
73
See id. at 2421 (explaining that, although the Court in Grutter relied, in part, on the
university’s good faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives, that did not necessarily
mean that good faith would compensate for impermissible race classifications for purposes
of strict scrutiny review).
74
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (majority opinion) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)).
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“[s]trict scrutiny must not be strict in theory but feeble in fact.”75 Taken
as a whole, this language foreshadows, at worst, the complete reversal of
Grutter or, at best, the heightening of judicial scrutiny such that it will be
nearly impossible for an affirmative action plan to be deemed
constitutional.
This constitutional landscape deters rather than encourages
institutions of higher education from pursuing the benefits of diversity
via race-based means. Rather than exposing themselves to expensive
litigation costs in efforts to successfully defend their consideration of
race in admissions decisions, many school administrators may decide to
terminate their affirmative action plans. It also discourages universities
that currently consider race in their admissions decisions from
experimenting with beneficial race-neutral alternatives, as Grutter
instructed,76 for fear of jeopardizing their ability to also rely on racebased measures.
While purported race-neutral methods may be available, the
experiences UT encountered demonstrate the potential ineffectiveness of
solely relying on race-neutral programs to enroll a critical mass of
racially diverse students such that the educational and social benefits of
diversity can actually be realized.77 Despite the levels of racial diversity
to which the Percent Plan and other race-neutral measures had
contributed,78 UT found that most of its undergraduate courses lacked
meaningful racial diversity.79 In addition, minority students experienced
feelings of isolation, and the majority of undergraduate students felt that
the lack of classroom diversity impeded their ability to fully experience
the benefits of diversity.80 The University reintroduced race as an
admissions factor in an attempt to remedy the shortcomings of its raceneutral admissions policy.81
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421.
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (“Narrow tailoring does, however, require serious, good
faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the
university seeks.”).
77
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 223–25 (5th Cir. 2011) (discussing
the issues UT encountered with regard to drawing a diverse student body prior to
implementing the plan at issue in the case), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
78
See supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining that after the University altered
its admissions and placed the Percent Plan into place, the environment at UT became more
diverse).
79
See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2416 (providing UT’s assertion that a race-conscious admissions
process was necessary because the school lacked a critical mass of minority students);
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 225–26 (noting that a survey of undergraduate classes showed a small
percentage of minority students).
80
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 225; see Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2416 (explaining that UT relied on
reports from students regarding diversity in the classroom).
81
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2416; Fisher, 631 F.3d at 226, 230–31, 239.
75
76
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The Court’s unwillingness to consider and uphold the UT plan
under the constitutional standards set forth in Grutter suggests that a
majority of the justices felt that Grutter is not the correct constitutional
standard by which to adjudicate affirmative action cases, or, based on the
evidence available to the Court, the University’s plan is not
constitutional. Justice Ginsberg wrote a dissenting opinion concluding
that “[t]he Court rightly declines to cast off the equal protection
framework settled in Grutter. Yet it stops short of reaching the
conclusion that framework warrants.”82 However, Justice Ginsburg was
the sole voice advocating for both Grutter and the constitutionality of the
UT plan, which does not bode well for the continual consideration of
race and ethnicity in universities’ admissions decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Fisher decision could have been worse, had the Court
decided to strike down the challenged plan, this Essay fears that the
Court may have simply delayed the eventual, inevitable result in the
case. As Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence regarding race and education
cases demonstrates, he has historically been opposed to sanctioning the
use of racial classifications to assemble diverse student bodies.83 The
explicit and implicit language contained in his Fisher opinion suggests
that he would have continued to adhere to this trend had the Court
examined the constitutionality of the UT plan. In light of this possibility
and the uncertain future of race-based affirmative action in higher
education, all universities, including the University of Texas, should
earnestly endeavor to develop and implement strategies and programs
that not only effectively admit a critical mass of racially diverse students
but also ensure that the educational and social benefits of diversity are
realized once they are admitted. With or without affirmative action,
engaging in these endeavors is the moral obligation of every institution
of higher education.

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2434 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
See supra Part II.B (discussing Justice Kennedy’s opinions in prior affirmative action
cases and explaining how his statements in those opinions signal an opposition to the use
of race-based classifications in admissions procedures).
82
83
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